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Abstract
I study the relationship between the likelihood of a violent domestic conflict and
the risk that such a conflict “externalizes” (i.e. spreads to another country by creating
an international dispute). I consider a situation in which a domestic conflict between a
government and a rebel group has the potential to externalize. I show that the risk of ex-
ternalization increases the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, but only if the government
is sufficiently powerful relative to the rebels, the risk of externalization is sufficiently
high, and the foreign actor who can intervene in the domestic conflict is sufficiently
uninterested in material costs and benefits. I show how this model helps to under-
stand the recent and successful peace process between the Colombian government and
the country’s most powerful rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC).
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1 Introduction
The existing theoretical literature on civil wars often assumes that a group’s decision of
whether to fight depends exclusively on the domestic context, i.e. on other domestic groups’
decisions.1 However, an increasing empirical literature on conflict is demonstrating that the
regional context also plays an important role in domestic conflicts.2 Researchers are well aware
of the regional dimensions of conflicts in Myanmar, Nicaragua, Kosovo, Sudan, Lebanon and
Iraq, for example.3
In this paper, I develop a simple model of conflict externalization, and provide new case-
study evidence from Colombia. The objective of the model is to formalize an existing theory,
and to propose a new mechanism through which the possibility that an external party inter-
venes in an internal conflict could affect the outcome of the conflict. In addition to demon-
strating the applicability of the model, the Colombian case provides new evidence on this
topic.
In the model, a government and a group of rebels simultaneously choose whether to attack
each other. Attacking is costly, but can also decrease the opponent’s military resources, which
increases the aggressor’s probability of victory. Crucially, the use of violence might cause a
third (foreign) actor to join in the conflict. When this happens, I say that the domestic conflict
“externalizes.”
This externalization changes the power dynamic between the two domestic actors. I assume
that only the government’s use of violence can trigger such an externalization. For example,
consider a group of rebels strategically located along a porous border, where the neighboring
country shares an ideology or ethnicity with the rebels. Given the relationship between the
rebels and the neighboring country’s government, an aggression might be viewed as a violation
of the neighboring country’s sovereignty and could motivate a military response, starting a
conflict spiral that might lead to an international war.4 I focus on how the threat of such an
external conflict affects the likelihood of peace between domestic actors.
This paper’s first main contribution is to show that the risk of externalization increases
the likelihood of peace, but that this only happens if a government is sufficiently powerful
relative to rebels, if the risk of externalization is sufficiently high, and if a foreign actor is
sufficiently uninterested in material costs and benefits.
This paper’s second main contribution is new case-study evidence from Colombia. Colom-
bia has suffered one of the world’s longest-running internal conflicts. Although many armed
groups have participated in the conflict, the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-
bia (FARC) was always the largest non-government actor. In September 2012, the Colombian
1See Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Jackson and Morelli (2011) for reviews of this literature.
2See Mason et al. (1999), Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Gleditsch (2007), Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008) and
Cunningham et al. (2009, 2011) for evidence showing that the regional context (e.g. a conflict in a neighboring
country, a highly autocratic region, trans-boundary ethnic groups, or direct intervention of external parties)
matters for the onset, incidence and duration of civil wars.
3See South (2008) for the conflict in Myanmar; Gleditsch and Beardsley (2004) for the Nicaragua-Contras
conflict; Crawford (2001) and Kuperman (2008) for Kosovo; Ali et al. (2005) for Sudan; Bouckaert and Houry
(2007) for Lebanon; and Gunter (2008) and Morelli and Pischedda (2013) for the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict.
4As I will argue later, this situation matches the recent dynamic of the Colombian internal conflict. It
is also consistent with Myanmar-Thailand border clashes prompted by Myanmar pursuit of Karen National
Liberation Army rebels across the border into Thailand; see South (2008, 2012).
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government announced the start of new peace negotiations following an extensive military
campaign that severely damaged the FARC. This announcement surprised many analysts and
national leaders, who expected a few more years of war, ending with a government victory.
In July 2016, the Colombian government and the FARC signed a historic peace deal, which
earned then-Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize.
Despite its relevance, to the best of my knowledge no rationalist explanation has been
proposed to account for both the onset and success of this Colombia’s historic peace process
with the FARC. I show that the risk of externalization of the Colombian conflict (to Venezuela)
was at the root of the peace negotiations, creating what has been called a situation that was
“ripe for resolution” Zartman (2000).
The theory proposed in this paper relates to the literature studying the interdependence of
intra- and inter-group conflicts (see for instance Baik and Lee, 2000; Stein and Rapoport, 2004;
Hausken, 2005; Mu¨nster, 2007; Mu¨nster and Staal, 2011; Choi et al., 2016). Using models
of group contest, these studies examine conflicts within or between groups that occur either
sequentially or simultaneously. This paper uses a contest model with sequential actions (as in
Baik and Lee, 2000; Stein and Rapoport, 2004; Mu¨nster and Staal, 2011), with heterogeneity
within groups (as in Choi et al., 2016). However, those studies focus on scenarios in which
all members of a domestic group have a common interest in fighting a foreign enemy, whereas
this paper focuses on a scenario with two domestic groups, where one group is closely aligned
with a foreign group and the other is not.
This paper is also related to the few but increasing theoretical studies on third-party
interventions (see Fearon, 1998; Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Werner, 2000; Crawford, 2003;
Carment and Rowlands, 2006; Amegashie and Kutsoati, 2007; Mu¨nster, 2007; Mu¨nster and
Staal, 2011; Kydd and Straus, 2013). Specifically, it is consistent with what this literature
calls the “deterrence” hypothesis: the idea that an external party can play a crucial role in
the outcome of an internal conflict by deterring one of the domestic parties from making a
decision that harms its opponent (see Fearon, 1998; Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Werner,
2000; Crawford, 2003). In my model, peace is possible because the risk of externalization
deters the government from attacking the rebels, given that it could prompt externalization
that could strengthen the rebels.5 As in Kydd and Straus (2013), I find that whether the
potential for an external intervention makes war less likely depends on whether power is
balanced, but unlike them, I find that peace is more likely when the government is stronger,
even if an intervention strengthens the rebel group.6
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents
and analyzes the case study based on the model. Section 4 concludes.
5Although the argument does not account for “moral hazard” — that an external intervention biased in
favor of one party might make this party more belligerent — the model in this paper can be easily extended
to include this possibility, which does not change the key findings. However, this phenomenon does not seem
to play an important role in the Colombian conflict, and despite its simplicity, the model is able to provide
non-trivial and new and empirical predictions.
6This paper also shares similarities with Bakshi and Dasgupta (2019), who study how the balance of power
between groups within a country affects group conflict in another country. Like Bakshi and Dasgupta, this
paper also studies the relationship between cross-border spillovers and conflict. However, unlike Bakshi and
Dasgupta (2019), the results in this paper crucially depend on the possibility of interstate conflict.
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2 Model
In this section, I develop a simple model that illustrates how the risk of a domestic conflict
externalizing can affect the outcome of the conflict.
Suppose that a government faces a rebel group. The government’s main goal is to defeat
the rebels. The rebels are not strong enough to defeat the government, but can harm the
government and thereby avoid being defeated. Both parties simultaneously choose whether
to attack the other or pursue peace. If either party attacks, the other party suffers a loss
L in military resources, and both parties lose an amount of wealth, C.7 Importantly, if the
government attacks the rebels, then a foreign government F can intervene. This intervention
is assumed to favor the rebel group,8 and always implies that the government is unable to
defeat the rebel group.9
The model focuses on the role of the government’s initial resources in determining the
outcome of the game. I use G to denote these resources. I assume that G ∈ (L,G).10 The
probability of the government and the rebels winning, for all outcomes in which F does not
intervene, depends on G. To model these probabilities, I first define a function Z such that
Z(x) = 0 for all x ≤ 0, so that Z ′ = 0 for all x < 0; Z ′ > 0 and Z ′′ ≤ 0 for all x ∈ (0, G); and
Z(x) = 1 for all x ≥ G. This function will be key in the analysis, and can interpreted as the
government’s probability of defeating the rebels if the group with the most resources wins,11
and if the resources of the rebels are random.12
7The assumption that C and L are the same for both groups seem restrictive. However, the results are
robust to potential differences, within certain constraints.
8The assumption that an external intervention can occur only if the government attacks the rebels is
crucial for the main result (that, under certain conditions, peace is selected as the unique equilibrium). If an
external intervention could also occur when the rebels attack the government, then conflict would always be
an equilibrium, and the conditions for an additional peaceful equilibrium would be harder to achieve. Thus,
this alternative scenario would imply weaker results. However, the mechanism would be the same. The details
for this alternative scenario are available upon request.
9For an intuition of the types of situations I try to model, consider a domestic conflict where some rebels
are located close to a border shared with F . Given the proximity of the rebels to F , and the ability of the
rebels to move between the two countries (because of either porous borders or sympathy from F ), an offensive
action by the government in the rebels’s controlled territory might harm the citizens of F or be interpreted by
F as a violation of its sovereignty. This implies a strong reaction by F to try and ensure that the government
is unable to defeat the rebels. This intervention can be interpreted either as a direct attack on the government,
or as military aid to the rebels. In Section 3, I argue that this scenario is consistent with what occurred prior
to the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC.
10The fact that G > L implies that the harm caused by the government’s violence is limited by the
government’s resources. The condition G > G defines an upper bound for G.
11This means that if the resources of the groups A and B are RA and RB , respectively, then the probability
of victory for group A is 1 if RA > RB , 0 if RA < RB and 1/2 if RA = RB . This form of modeling the
winning probabilities is known as an “all-pay auction.” It has been used to study contests in which group
members exert effort that translate into “group effort” (see for instance Baik et al., 2001; Barbieri et al., 2014;
Chowdhury et al., 2016; Chowdhury and Topolyan, 2016a,b). Under this interpretation, the scenarios in which
one group defends against another group’s attack (as in Chowdhury and Topolyan, 2016a), and where the
aggregation technology is asymmetric among the contesting groups (as in Chowdhury and Topolyan, 2016b)
are particularly important.
12To see this, define R as the resources of the rebels, and assume that R is a random variable on R with
a cumulative distribution function Z such that Z(x) = 0 for all x ≤ 0, Z ′ > 0,Z ′′ ≤ 0 for all x ∈ (0, G),
and Z(x) = 1 for all x ≥ G. Thus, if the winning probabilities are defined as an “all-pay auction,” we have
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Specifically, let Z(G) be the government’s probability of defeating the rebels when both
parties attack and F does not intervene. When the rebels attack but the government chooses
peace, the government loses L in military resources, so its probability of winning is Z(G−L).
The winning probabilities are defined analogously when the government attacks but neither
the rebels nor the foreign country attack.13 When no group attacks, peace occurs; in this
scenario, the parties compete in an election in which each party’s probability of winning
depends on the relative initial resources.14
Finally, F ’s decision of whether to intervene depends negatively on the resources of the
government: the greater these resources, the less likely it is that F will intervene because F ’s
potential losses are greater. However, and importantly, F may not be purely interested in
material costs and benefits. F may have ideological or religious motivations, which, insofar
as they involve agents that can be difficult to negotiate with, can be viewed as being not
materially based (in this respect, see Jackson and Morelli, 2011).15 Specifically, F ’s goals are
purely material with probability 1 − φ, in which case its decision to intervene depends on
G. F ’s goals are not materially based with probability φ, in which case the probability of an
intervention is assumed to be exogenous and normalized to one.16
Timing
(1) The government and the rebels simultaneously decide whether to attack each other.
(2) If either party decides to attack, a violent conflict occurs. If neither party attacks,
peace occurs, and the parties compete in an election in which each party’s probability
of winning depends on its relative initial resources.
(3) If there is a violent conflict, both parties face exogenous costs C > 0. In addition, the
military resources of a party decrease by L if it is attacked.
(4) F observes whether the government attacked. If the government attacked, F intervenes
with probability φ, and makes a determination on whether or not to intervene based on
G with probability (1− φ). If F intervenes, the government cannot defeat the rebels.
(5) The violent conflict ends. Each group receives a payoff according to the outcome, which
is described in the next subsection.
that the government’s probability of victory is Pr[G > R] = Z(G) if both groups attack. The other winning
probabilities can be defined analogously. The randomness of R is consistent with the rebels being somewhat
informal. This may be particularly true if the rebels are located along the borders with F , if these borders are
porous, and if there is uncertainty about how effectively F surveils its border (as the level of arms or troops
flowing in from F may be unknown).
13As previously mentioned, when F intervenes, the government’s probability of defeating the rebels is 0.
14This can be interpreted as an scenario in which the political parties that represent the interests of the
groups compete for seats in the national assembly under a proportional representation system. It is also
consistent with a number of seats in the national assembly being given to the rebels under the terms of a
peace deal that guarantees proportional representation for the rebels. These scenarios are consistent with
what occurred after the 2016 peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC.
15As will be discussed in Section 3, ideology is crucial to understanding Venezuela’s motivation to intervene
in the Colombian conflict. In addition to Jackson and Morelli (2011), see Maynard (2019), who discusses the
role of ideology in armed conflicts, and Owen (2010), who provides examples in international politics.
16This normalization is without loss of generality; what matters is that the probability of an intervention
when F ’s goals are not materially based is exogenous.
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Payoffs
The preferences of the domestic groups are characterized by a Bernoulli utility function,
where each party gets a payoff of 1 if it wins, and 0 if it loses. The payoff function of the
government is denoted by pi, and the payoff function of the rebels is denoted by ρ. Note that
these functions depend on what the domestic groups simultaneously decide (either attack (a)
or peace (p)), as well as on the foreign government’s decision about whether to intervene (a)
or not (p).
Since the government and rebels do not know whether F will intervene when deciding on
their military actions, I use Φ to denote each group’s expectation that such an intervention
will occur (conditional on an attack by the government). Thus, given an attack by the rebels,
the government’s expected payoff from attacking is pi(a, a) = (1−Φ)Z(G)−C.17 The expected
payoffs for all cases, after rearranging and omitting some constants, are given in Table I.
Rebels
(a) (p)
Govt.
(a)
pi = (1− Φ)Z(G)− C pi = (1− Φ)Z(G+ L)− C
ρ = −(1− Φ)Z(G)− C ρ = −(1− Φ)Z(G+ L)− C
(p)
pi = Z(G− L)− C pi = Z(G)
ρ = −Z(G− L)− C ρ = −Z(G)
Table I: Expected payoffs for government and rebels
I model F ’s decision about whether to intervene in a very simple and stylized way. First,
I assume that a foreign intervention is less likely when the government is stronger. Then,
I define W (G) as the probability of an intervention from the perspective of the government
and rebels when F is interested in material benefits, and where W is a function such that
W (x) = 0 for all x ≥ A > G, W (x) = 1 for all x ≤ 0, and for all x ∈ (0, A), W ′ < 0 and
W ′′ ≤ 0.18
Additional assumptions
Assumption 1. C > Z(L).
Assumption 1 guarantees that the cost of using violence is high enough that a peace
agreement is always possible.
Assumption 2. Let sup
{ Z′(G)
W ′(G) |G ∈ (L,G)
} ≡ k. Then W (G)k < −1.
17Note that, with some abuse of notation, I have defined pi(a, a) ≡ Ex[pi(a, a, x)], where x ∈ {a, p} is F ’s
choice, and Ex is the government’s expectation about x.
18A very simple micro-foundation for W is the following. First, define F ’s payoff as equal to B − G if F
intervenes, and 0 if it does not intervene, where B represents any material benefit derived from the intervention.
Then, assume that B is unknown to the government and the rebels and that, from the point of view of these
parties, it has a cumulative distribution function V defined on R such that V (x) = 1 for all x ≥ A > G,
V (x) = 0 for all x ≤ 0, and for all x ∈ (0, A), V ′ > 0 and V ′′ ≥ 0. Finally, set W (x) ≡ 1− V (x).
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Assumption 2 is a technical condition, and allows for a simpler characterization of the
government’s best response to a rebel attack.19
Assumption 3. (1−W (G)) > Z(G− L).
Assumption 3 guarantees that given an attack by the rebels, the government’s best re-
sponse function dictates that the government should also attack, even if the probability of a
foreign intervention is small.
2.1 Equilibrium
I will now characterize the equilibrium of the game. I focus on the intuition for the main
equilibrium decisions, and leave the formal derivation to the Appendix.
First, note that from the point of view of both the government and rebels, a foreign
intervention will occur with probability Φ = φ+ (1−φ)W (G) (conditional on the government
attacking). Replacing this expression in the payoff functions of the government and the rebels,
and computing each group’s best response function, it is possible to establish a set of non-
trivial conditions under which a conflict occurs in equilibrium. These conditions focus on the
exogenous component of the risk of a foreign intervention (i.e. φ), and on the government’s
resources (i.e. G). They constitute the main result of this section, which is summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Consider the above-described game. Let φ ≡ 1− Z(G−L)
(1−W (G)) . Given Assumptions
1-3, the following hold:
(i) Given any φ ∈ [0, 1] and any G ∈ (L,G), (p, p) must constitute a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Whenever φ ≤ φ, (a, a) constitutes a Nash equilibrium for all G ∈ (L,G).
(iii) Whenever 1 > φ > φ, there exists Gˆ(φ) ∈ (L,G), with Gˆ′(φ) < 0, such that (a, a)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if G ≤ Gˆ(φ).
(iv) Whenever φ = 1, (p, p) constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium.
(v) Neither (a, p) nor (p, a) can constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1, first note that if the risk of an external
intervention is low, a well-resourced government can easily defeat the rebels. Such a govern-
ment will have a strong incentive to attack the rebels, so a violent conflict will constitute a
Nash equilibrium. In addition, note that this scenario is consistent with the assumption that
the risk of an external intervention decreases with the strength of the government.
However, and importantly, recall that the risk of an external intervention only partially
depends on the government’s resources. How does this affect the mechanism described in the
19This assumption can be relaxed at the cost of much less general functions Z and W . Two functions Z
and W that satisfy Assumption 2 are: Z(x) = x/G if x ∈ [0, G], Z(x) = 0 if x < 0, Z(x) = 1 if x > G, and
W (x) = (1− x/A) for x ∈ [0, A] and with A > 2G. More generally, when Z(x) = (x/G)β with β ∈ (0, 1], and
W (x) = (1− x/A)γ with γ ∈ (0, 1], then it is easy to see that Assumption 2 holds if (βγ )(A−GG ) > 1. I thank
a referee for suggesting this Assumption and example.
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last paragraph? Crucially, it allows for a non-trivial and new mechanism through which peace
can prevail (i.e. in which (p, p) is selected as the unique Nash equilibrium).
This mechanism is based on the idea that when the risk of an external intervention does
not entirely depend on the material resources of the groups in conflict, a well-resourced gov-
ernment may have less incentive to attack the rebels. Why? Because this government is better
able to tolerate a rebel attack, and by doing so, it can decrease the risk of an external inter-
vention. Importantly, this may happen even if a well-resourced government faces a relatively
low probability of an external intervention. For a well-resourced government, the pro-peace
effects of resources (a greater capacity to tolerate a rebel attack) can outweigh pro-war effects
(a greater capacity to defeat the rebels).
Proposition 1.(iii) establishes two conditions for the selection of the peaceful scenario de-
scribed in the last paragraph: the foreign actor should be sufficiently uninterested in material
costs and benefits (such that the strength of the government is not a big deterrent to interven-
ing), and the government should be sufficiently resourced (such that it can tolerate an attack
from the rebels without being seriously harmed).20 To the best of my knowledge, this result
is new in the literature. In the next section, I show that it is crucial to understanding the
intriguing peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC.
3 Case study evidence from Colombia
In this section, I show how the model proposed in the previous section explains case study
evidence from Colombia. I use information from the main actors in the Colombian conflict,
as well as from the secondary academic literature.
3.1 Background
The conflict between the Colombian government and the left-wing rebels dates back to the
late 1950s. Its origins have been associated with the founding of the FARC, which was always
Colombia’s largest and best-equipped rebel group.21 Between 1958 and 2012, the conflict
claimed at least 220,000 lives (see GMH, 2013, p. 31).
From the 1980s until its end, the Colombian conflict was accompanied by several negoti-
ations, including three failed peace talks with the FARC (see Sanchez, 2001; Chernick, 2009;
Nasi, 2009). This section focuses on the most recent (and successful) peace talks, which oc-
curred from 2010 to 2016. These peace talks were preceded by the “Cagua´n” peace process,
which occurred from 1998 to 2002, and which failed miserably. A relatively weak government,
amateurish bargaining teams and spoilers (actors who use violence to undermine peace talks)
are some of the explanations given for Cagua´n’s failure (see Kline, 2007; Nasi, 2009). The
breakdown of the Cagua´n peace process led to the election, in 2002, of a hawkish and far-right
20If either of these two conditions are not satisfied, Proposition 1.(ii) and Proposition 1.(iii) imply that, in
equilibrium, both the government and the rebels will attack (which means that (a, a) also constitutes a Nash
equilibrium). A weak government will attack the rebels (regardless of the risk of foreign intervention) when
the government has a limited ability to defend itself from a rebel attack if the government chooses peace.
21Other smaller rebel groups participated in Colombia’s conflict. These include other left-wing insurgents
and right-wing paramilitaries. The most important left-wing insurgent other than the FARC is the National
Liberation Army (ELN). The main right-wing paramilitary group was the United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC), which officially demobilized in 2006.
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president, Alvaro Uribe, and started a period of intense war between the government and the
FARC.
3.1.1 Government empowerment
During the 2000s and early 2010s, Colombia’s government pursued an all-out military effort
against the FARC. Due to an increase in defense spending and a significant improvement in
military effectiveness, the Colombian government achieved relative success: during this period,
the FARC suffered the worst blows in its history. According to the Colombian Ministry of
Defense, an average of 40 FARC members were captured or killed annually from 2002 and
2011. In the same period, roughly 17 members deserted the FARC each year, and the number
of FARC combatants was halved.22 The government also killed the head of the FARC and
several other leaders, in an action characterized by the Colombian president as “the most
devastating blow that this group has suffered in its history.”23 These actions were deeply
resented by the FARC.24
During this period, the FARC retreated from key regions in the center of the country (i.e.
the departments of Cundinamarca, Tolima, and Santander) to border areas with Venezuela
and Ecuador (i.e. to the departments of Narin˜o, Cauca, Caqueta´, Norte de Santander and
Arauca) (see IISS, 2011; Avila, 2013). The FARC’s decision to move to the periphery of the
country was strategic, given ideological similarities between the FARC and the governments
of Venezuela and Ecuador, and the porousness of the borders with these two countries (see
Owen, 2010, p. 257). The FARC’s decision, combined with a hawkish military strategy by
the Colombian government, brought the three countries to the brink of war. I argue that it
also raised the likelihood of a peaceful solution.
3.1.2 On the brink of war
In March 2008, Colombian security forces crossed into Ecuador to assault an outpost of the
FARC. More than two dozen rebels were killed, including a high-ranking leader thought by
many to be FARC’s second-in-command. The Colombian government also captured computers
with documents indicating that Venezuela had been supporting the FARC (see IISS, 2011).
The assault caused a serious diplomatic incident between Colombia and Ecuador. Ecuador
immediately broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia. Venezuela, in solidarity with
Ecuador, expelled Colombia’s ambassador and other diplomats.25 Venezuela and Ecuador
also sent troops to the Colombian border, advising that any additional violations of their
sovereignty would result in war.26 The tension reached a peak in July 2010 when, weeks
before a change in Colombia’s government, the Colombian press secretary provided evidence
of a FARC presence in Venezuela to international authorities.27
22See Ministerio de Defensa (2009) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnuqZOwOBoo. The exact
number of FARC members who deserted or were captured or killed has been debated by analysts (Avila, 2013;
Rico, 2013) and the FARC (FARC-EP, 2013b, Feb. 12), but analysts agree with the government that the
number of combatants fell by roughly half during the 2000s.
23Translation by the author from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UI0CJzJLsxU.
24See http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=138858.
25See The New York Times (2008, Mar. 4)
26See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xp7Gs1-tm1w.
27According to the Colombian press secretary, “For six years the Colombian government sustained a patient
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In the following days, the Colombian Ambassador to the Organization of American States
(OAS) presented photographs, maps, coordinates, and videos proving the presence of illegal
armed groups in Venezuelan territory.28 Venezuela reacted by breaking off diplomatic relations
with Colombia, sending more troops to the border and ordering them to be on full alert.
Venezuela’s then-President Hugo Chavez said:
To maintain our dignity, we do not have any other option but to sever diplomatic ties with
Colombia [...] We will be on alert —I have ordered the maximum alert along our border
[...] Uribe is a threat for peace. He is even able to establish a fake camp in our territory
and raid it to start a war.29
The Colombian government was aware of the high risk of war, particularly if it violated a
neighbor’s sovereignty. The Colombian Minister of Defense at the time, Gabriel Silva, said:
I said privately to President Uribe, “If you give an authorization, I will bring back to
Colombia [all FARC leaders] who are there [in Venezuela]” [...] He did not authorize. He
said it was too risky for the country and for national security [...] I do believe that there
was very nearly a war with Venezuela. (Davila, 2014, p. 89-91; translation of the author).
3.1.3 A moment in history
In July 2010, Colombia severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela. Two weeks later, a
new Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, took office. Known for his strategic prag-
matism, Santos was closely associated with Uribe’s successful military campaigns against the
FARC and elected with a mandate to continue Uribe’s hard-line policies.30
From his early days in office, Santos combined an extremely aggressive campaign against
the FARC with efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Venezuela. Ten days after he
was sworn in, diplomatic relations with Venezuela were restored, and approximately one
month later, Santos announced the death of the FARC’s second-in-command and leader of its
strongest fighting division. One year later, the FARC’s top leader, who went by the nom de
guerre of Alfonso Cano, was killed. The FARC’s choice for Cano’s replacement, whose nom
de guerre was Timochenko, was also influential: Timochenko was known for operating along
the border with Venezuela and for having lived there previously.31 In addition, many people
had raised concerns about the close ties between Timochenko and important figures in the
Venezuelan government.32
In September 2012, almost one year after Timochenko had become the FARC’s leader,
the Colombian president announced that his government and the FARC had agreed to start
a peace process. The announcement surprised analysts and national leaders.33 These peace
dialogue with the Venezuelan government, on various occasions providing it information on the location of
terrorists in that territory. All was unsuccessful with respect to terrorist leaders. We must once again consider
taking the matter to international authorities.” See Presidencia (2010, July 16).
28See OAS (2010, July 22) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J2W0EO27yEQ.
29Translation by the author from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ql_AFMvwg9U. As Serbin and Serbin
(2017) say, “this mobilization of troops was not a minor factor [...] Since 1987 [....] there had been no
mobilization of the Venezuelan military at this scale” (see Serbin and Serbin, 2017, p. 241).
30See Revista Semana (2010, June 12).
31See El Tiempo (2011b, Nov. 15) and El Tiempo (2011a, Nov. 19).
32Timochenko was called the FARC’s “ambassador” to Venezuela (see Caracol Noticias, 2010, Mar. 2).
33See Revista Semana (2012, Sept. 3) for initial reactions.
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talks were the first open negotiations in a decade. In July 2016, Colombian President Juan
Manuel Santos and the FARC signed a historic peace deal.34 In October 2016, Juan Manuel
Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the Colombian civil war.35
3.2 Analysis
Why did Colombia and the FARC decide to pursue peace? I suggest that the risk of
externalization of the Colombian conflict to Venezuela, the politicization of Venezuela’s foreign
policy, and the military strength of the Colombian government are at the root of the peace
deal, creating what some literature on conflict has called a “ripe for resolution” situation (e.g.
see Zartman, 2000).
The FARC’s motivations for peace seem clear: it suffered significant setbacks between
2002 and 2011, and its leaders seemed convinced that they had no chance of defeating their
enemy. Talking about the relevance of the setbacks, the FARC’s leader, Timochenko, said in
2012: “I can’t deny we’ve received serious blows —and extremely painful ones. The deaths
of four members of the National Secretariat can’t be minimized [...] it’s obvious that today’s
conditions are not the same as a decade ago.”36 Asked why the FARC decided to negotiate
with Santos, Timochenko responded that the costs of continuing the conflict would have been
very high:37
Whatever may come, persistent conflict will entail many more deaths and great destruc-
tion, more sorrow and tears, more poverty and misery for some and greater wealth for
others. Imagine the lives that could have been saved over the past 10 years. That’s why
we seek negotiations, a solution without blood, and an understanding through political
routes. (Carlos Lozano’s website, 2012, Sept. 19; translation of the author).
The Colombian government’s motivations for negotiating with the FARC are less apparent.
Analysts and the Colombian government have highlighted the increase in the power of Colom-
bian forces relative to the FARC.38 But if the Colombian government was winning the war,
why wouldn’t it continue fighting the FARC for a few more years, as advocated for by former
president Uribe?39 War is costly and unpredictable, so rational agents should have incentives
to reach peaceful settlements that all would prefer to war. However, from the point of view
of the majority of the Colombian population, media, and important leaders, just before the
peace talks were made public, the FARC were close to being defeated. Thus, the govern-
ment’s cost of war could be perceived as being very low. In addition, at the time, a peace
34See The New York Times (2016a, Sept. 26).
35See The New York Times (2016b, Oct. 7).
36Carlos Lozano’s website (2012, Sept. 19), translation of the author.
37The FARC’s strategy may have always been respond to peace with peace. According to the FARC’s
leader, the FARC “negotiate because a political solution has always been our objective, and also that of the
people’s movement” (Carlos Lozano’s website, 2012, Sept. 19, translation of the author). This awareness was
also recognized by FARC’s representative of the peace delegation, Pablo Catatumbo: “We are ready to start
preparing the way that will lead us towards the expression of our regret for what has happened ... No doubt
there has also been harshness and pain caused from our side.” (FARC-EP, 2013a, translation of the author).
38For instance, Colombian president Santos said in 2012, “If we can talk about peace now [...] it is because
of the effectiveness of our armed forces.” (See Presidencia, 2012b, Oct. 25, translation of the author).
39See Caracol Noticias (2012, Oct. 28).
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process seemed riskier, and the FARC was widely seen as untrustworthy.40 I argue that the
main reasons the government chose peace was the high risk of an international conflict with
Venezuela, the extreme politicization of Venezuela’s foreign policy, and the Colombian gov-
ernment’s significant military strength. According to the theory proposed in Section 2, these
conditions are sufficient for a peaceful equilibrium.
Were these conditions satisfied just before the start of the peace talks between the Colom-
bian government and the FARC? I already argued (in subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2) that two
of these conditions were likely satisfied. First, I showed that just before the start of the
peace talks, the government was as strong as ever. A military victory by the FARC (or any
other non-state armed group) was seen as so unlikely that the discussion was entirely focused
on when — not if — the government would defeat the guerrilla groups. Second, I showed
that just before Santos took power, the risk of an interstate conflict between Colombia and
Venezuela was extremely high. This risk was directly related to the presence of the FARC
in Venezuelan territory, the very likely possibility that Colombia might violate Venezuelan
sovereignty to pursue the rebels, and Venezuela’s determination to respond if this happened.
The third condition — the extreme politicization of Venezuela’s foreign policy — was
also met. According to Serbin and Serbin (2017), Venezuela’s oil-based foreign activism was
amplified under the presidency of Hugo Chavez, and, importantly, included:
“the unbridled involvement of the president in foreign affairs and its extreme politicization
[...] [and this trait was expressed in] the role assigned to the armed forces in dealing with
a potential asymmetric conflict with the United States, in developing links and military
exchanges with countries in the region and beyond, and in establishing ties with irregular
forces such as the guerrilla movements” (Serbin and Serbin, 2017, p. 239)
The conflict with Colombia just before the start of the peace talks seems to be a perfect exam-
ple of this activism: Colombian had Latin America’s most pro-American president, the Colom-
bian armed forces were perceived by Chavez as being commanded by the United States,41 and
the FARC and Chavez were not only ideologically very close (i.e. both were left-wing ad
anti-American), but shared an explicit Pan-American “Bolivarian” discourse.42
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a simple model of conflict externalization and provide new case
study evidence from Colombia. The first main contribution of the paper is to show that the
risk of externalization of a domestic conflict increases the likelihood of peace, but that this
only happens if the domestic government is sufficiently powerful, if the risk of an external
intervention is sufficiently high, and if the foreign party that may intervene is sufficiently
uninterested in material costs and benefits.
40In the speech announcing the opening of peace talks, Santos said, “There comes a moment in history
when you have to take risks to arrive at a solution [...] This is one of those moments.” (See Presidencia, 2012a,
Sept. 4, translation of the author).
41Motivated by Colombia’s plans to allow the US to use seven of its military bases, Chavez said in 2009:
“The Yankees are starting to command the Colombian armed forces. They are the ones who are in charge”
(Financial Times, 2009, Agu. 10)
42See Revista Semana (2008, Jan. 19).
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In the second part of the paper, I use the model to examine the Colombian conflict. I focus
on peace talks that occurred between 2010 and 2016 between the Colombian government and
the FARC. The second main contribution of the paper is to show how the risk of externalization
of the conflict to Venezuela played a crucial role in the success of these talks.
Although the theory is inspired by the Colombian conflict, its application is not limited to
this case. The model can be applied to any internal conflict in which governments, undertaking
cross-border counterinsurgency actions, initiate military actions against neighboring states.
While other explanations exist to explain how Colombian peace talks evolved, such as less
ideological extremism and less militarism from both parties, the evidence shows that the
possibility of externalization should be considered in any examination of the issue.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. I solve the game by backward induction. Having examined F ’s decision
about whether to intervene in the main text, I must now examine the other groups’ optimal decisions
about whether to attack each other. I start by showing that, under Assumption 1, peace (i.e., (p, p))
always constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game. Then, I show that under Assumptions 2 and 3,
there is a threshold value for φ that determines whether war (i.e., (a, a)) is also a Nash equilibrium
of the game. I conclude by showing that neither (a, p) nor (p, a) can constitute a Nash equilibrium.
First, define pi(p, p) − pi(a, p) = Z(G) − (1 − φ)(1 − W (G))Z(G + L) + C, where pi(p, p) and
pi(a, p) are from Table I, and where I have used the fact that Φ = φ+ (1− φ)W (G). Now note that
if pi(p, p) > pi(a, p), then when the rebels seek peace, the government’s best response is also to seek
peace. In the last expression, note that pi(p, p) > pi(a, p) if and only if
C > (1− φ)(1−W (G))Z(G+ L)− Z(G). (1)
Now note that since Z(0) = 0, Z(x) = 1 for all x ≥ G, and Z ′ > 0 and Z ′′ ≤ 0 for all x ∈ (0, G),
then Assumption 1 implies that C > Z(x+L)−Z(x) for x ≥ 0. In particular, Assumption 1 implies
that C > Z(G + L) − Z(G) for G ∈ (L,G). Thus, since (1 − φ)(1 −W (G)) ≤ 1 for all G ∈ (L,G),
we have that (1) holds for all G ∈ (L,G).
Now define ρ(p, p)−ρ(p, a) = −Z(G) +Z(G−L) +C, where ρ(p, p) and ρ(p, a) are from Table I,
and where I have used the fact that Φ = φ+ (1− φ)W (G). Note that if ρ(p, p) > ρ(p, a), the rebels’
best response is to seek peace, given that the government also seeks peace. In the last expression,
note that ρ(p, p) > ρ(p, a) if and only if
C > Z(G)− Z(G− L). (2)
Since C > Z(x + L) − Z(x) for all x ≥ 0 (which follows from Assumption 1, as previously shown),
then choosing x = G− L for G ∈ (L,G), we have that (2) holds for all G ∈ (L,G).
We therefore have that peace (i.e., (p, p)) constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game. This proves
Proposition 1.(i).
Now I establish the conditions under which war (i.e., (a, a)) is also a Nash equilibrium of the
game. To do this, first define D ≡ pi(p, a)− pi(a, a), and note that if D > 0, then the government’s
best response to a rebel attack is to choose peace, and if D < 0, the government’s best response is
to attack. From Table I, note that D is equal to
D = Z(G− L)− (1− φ)(1−W (G))Z(G) (3)
where I have used the fact that Φ = φ+ (1− φ)W (G). Differentiating (3) with respect to G, we get
dD
dG
= Z ′(G− L)− (1− φ)(1−W (G))Z ′(G) + (1− φ)W ′(G)Z(G) (4)
which, rearranging the terms, is equivalent to
dD
dG
= [Z ′(G− L)− (1− φ)Z ′(G)] + (1− φ)W ′(G)Z(G)
[
1 +
W (G)Z ′(G)
W ′(G)Z(G)
]
. (5)
In (5), note that Z ′(G− L)− (1− φ)Z ′(G) ≥ 0 since Z ′′(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ (L,G). Thus, given any
φ ∈ [0, 1], a sufficient condition for dDdG > 0 is
1 +
W (G)Z ′(G)
W ′(G)Z(G)
< 0 (6)
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given that W ′ < 0 for all x ∈ (0, A) where A > G. I will now show that Assumption 2 implies that
(6) holds for all G ∈ (L,G). To see this, note that
1 +
W (G)
Z(G)
Z ′(G)
W ′(G)
≤ 1 + W (G)
Z(G)
k (7)
where k ≡ sup{ Z′(G)W ′(G) |G ∈ (L,G)}. In addition, note that since W ′(x) < 0 and Z ′(x) > 0 for all
x ∈ (0, G), we have that k ≤ 0, and that
1 +
W (G)
Z(G)
k ≤ 1 +W (G)k ≤ 1 +W (G)k. (8)
Combining (7) and (8), we have that
1 +
W (G)
Z(G)
Z ′(G)
W ′(G)
≤ 1 +W (G)k. (9)
So, if 1 +W (G)k < 0 (as stated in Assumption 2), then (6) holds. And if (6) holds, we have that
(5) is greater than zero given any φ ∈ [0, 1] and for all G ∈ (L,G).
Next, note that dDdG > 0 and L < G implies that
D ∈ (− (1− φ)(1−W (L))Z(L), Z(G− L)− (1− φ)(1−W (G))Z(G)) (10)
for any G ∈ (L,G). Since −(1 − φ)(1 − W (L))Z(L) < 0 when φ < 1, then, for this case, the
government’s best response to a rebel attack is always to counterattack if Z(G − L) − (1 − φ)(1 −
W (G))Z(G) < 0, or, equivalently, if
Z(G− L)− (1− φ)(1−W (G)) < 0 (11)
where I have used the fact that Z(G) = 1. To identify the conditions under which (11) holds, define
φ ≡ 1− Z(G− L)
(1−W (G)) (12)
and note that under Assumption 3, φ > 0. From (12), note that when φ < φ, (11) holds. This
means that when φ < φ, the government’s best response to a rebel attack is to also attack, regardless
of the value of G. And since the rebel’s best response to a government attack is clearly to attack,
then whenever φ ≤ φ and φ < 1, (a, a) there is a Nash equilibrium for all G ∈ (L,G). This proves
Proposition 1.(ii).
From (12), note that φ < 1, so there are values of φ such that 1 > φ > φ. For these values, note
that (11) does not hold. Combining this observation with the fact that dDdG > 0 for all G ∈ (L,G)
(and given any φ ∈ [0, 1]), we obtain that whenever 1 > φ > φ, there exists Gˆ(φ) ∈ (L,G), defined
implicitly by
Z(Gˆ− L) = (1− φ)(1−W (Gˆ))Z(Gˆ) (13)
such that (a, a) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if G ≤ Gˆ(φ). To see that Gˆ′(φ) < 0,
differentiate implicitly (13) with respect to φ to get Gˆ′(dDdG |G=Gˆ) + (1−W (Gˆ))Z(Gˆ) = 0; then note
that the fact that for any φ ∈ [0, 1], dDdG > 0 for G ∈ (L,G), and that (1 −W (Gˆ))Z(Gˆ) > 0, imply
that Gˆ′ < 0. This proves Proposition 1.(iii).
Finally, recall from the analysis above that the best response of both the rebels and government
is to seek peace when their opponent also seeks peace. This implies that neither (a, p) nor (p, a)
can constitute a Nash equilibrium (i.e., Proposition 1.(v)). This, combined with the fact that when
φ = 1, D = Z(G− L) > 0 for all G ∈ (L,G) proves Proposition 1.(iv).
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